The nuclear deterrence of North Korea and its possible effects.

When North Korea confirmed the 21^st of March, 2006, that was in possession of nuclear weapons, the international community answered with concern; as it meant the increase in the threat that North Korea represents for South Korea, Japan; and the stability of East Asia. But, there is another view of this issue that points in the direction that, with this new North Korean’s nuclear capabilities, the Peninsula of Korea is now more stable than decades ago.

Along this essay we are going to discuss these two points of view, and try to conclude which of these is the most correct one.

The first, and most rational, reaction, is of disquiet, as North Korea has threatened several times to start a war against South Korea; and has endangered the status quo with several military actions along the DMZ border (with attacks to US and ROK troops at Panmunjom in 1976, or the incursion of North Korean commandos in the Blue House, in 1968, in an attempt to assassinate the South Korea’s president, and several more) (Bruce & Hayes (2011) p. 71). In addition, North Korea has one of the largest number of soldiers and conventional forces in the world, with an estimated 1,400,000 million of personnel (mainly concentrated in the border with South Korea). (www.bbc.co.uk 20^th September 2011)

With the previous mentioned figures, and the latest missiles tests carried on (the last one that has been reported was the 7^th of January, 2011 (according with CNN 7^th January 2011)), there is a fear that North Korea is trying to develop Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) capable to carry nuclear heads. Also, there are some pieces of information that point to the fact that North Korea is transferring its nuclear and ballistic knowledge to potential destabilizing countries like Syria or Iran, with close ties with North Korea. Even, one jet from Israel attacked one facility in Syria that was thought to be a nuclear reactor under construction with help from North Korea (Jeffries (2010) p. 15-16).

With the previously mentioned facts, North Korea could be considered as a major threat for East Asia, and even the Western world. But the truth is that, it is a threat, but not of “big concern” as it would be thought. This can be affirmed because almost all its military equipment is Soviet technology of the 1970s, or earlier (Cha & Kang (2003) p. 53), the country suffers serious energy restrictions as its major supplier of oil and gas was the former Soviet Union, which supplied the country at subsidised prices, but now Russia is willing to do so with the condition that this service would be provided at market prices. This, linked with the fact that 60% of the pit coal mines are flooded, leaves the country in a difficult situation; and, although with the songun doctrine (all the country’s resources are destined to the army), its capability is not bigger, as it suffers petrol restrictions, and, for example, the engine vehicles cannot be used as much as it would be necessary for a proper training of the soldiers (the pilots take one training flight per month, rather than the US ones that takes 10 (Cha & Kang (2003) p. 52)). During the 1960s and beginning of 70s North Korea was in advantage in economic and military terms, but with the collapse of its heavy industrialized economic model, South Korea overtook it. And, as an illustrative example, in 1997 South Korea spent $14billion in the military budget, when North Korea spent only $5billion. (Kang & Cha (2003) p. 50).

After the Korean War North Korea recovered faster than its neighbour in the South because of the communist policies that boosted a fast industrialisation. And also because the help of the Soviet Union and China (North Korea tried to be neutral in this aspect and do not support one side against the other)

Without its ancient allies (Russia and China, that is starting to be a global actor, refusing to be involved in regional problems), North Korea is an anachronic an authoritarian dictatorship with a communist economic that is proved to have failed (and led to famines and economic recession during the 90s). In the international sphere its situation was not much better, as it only held relations with pariah states, and the United States considered this country as a real threat (in fact they still in war, because no peace treaty was signed between them at the end of the Korean War), and wanted to isolate it in order to provoke the fall of the government.

Surpassed by South Korea in economy, military (in quality terms, and backed by the US troops deployed there) North Korea was not in position to lead and impose its views in a possible unification of the peninsula, and what is more, in this conditions, its survival as a country was threatened, as it was more vulnerable to an attack.

To reach some parity in the military magnitude North Korea started to develop a nuclear weapons programme as earlier as in 1966/1967 (parity, because the US deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea after the war) (Bluth (2008) p. 148). Also, this type of arm would give North Korea the needed strength in the international meetings to ask for demands during the negotiations. In addition, it would give a higher status towards the US and South Korea. (Bluth (2008) p. 63)

The acquisition of nuclear weapons also was important for the regime in terms of reaffirmation of the authority inside its country and improving the relation with the military establishment. And avoiding with this action a possible coup d’état.

Towards other countries, it was also positive, as helped to elude a potential military joint action against the country, due the nuclear weapons act as an effective deterrent effect (Cha & Kang (2003) p. 54). This idea that the leaders of the regime had about the nuclear weapons was boosted by the Iraq war (Bluth (2008) p. 116) and later by the Libyan civil war, where Gadhafi gave up with his nuclear programme, and at the first opportunity was removed of his charge with the support of the Allies.

What is true is that the nuclear weapons gave stability to the North Korean regime. With North Korea in possession of them, South Korea and the US would not try to start a risky adventure to change the regime.

These, among other reasons, are why North Korea did not cooperated in the progress of the Six-Party Talks meetings about the denuclearisation of the country. It did not want to give up with one of the last resources it has left for a negotiation, and for asking for aid, while keeping the deterrent force.

Also, somehow, this nuclear programme was profitable for South Korea, and even China and Russia. Since North Korea was closer to collapse (because of the economic problems, the deteriorating situation of the army, and social problems like the famines that suffered the population), this collapse could have had a devastating effect. This could have produced a massive migration to South Korea that could not have been absorbed (China, since the 1950s, has received an approximated number of 500,000 North Koreans (Jeffries (2010) p. 71), provoking an economic and social crisis. And if South Korea would have had to annex North Korea it would have needed a large amount of money to do so, as this economy only represents, in economic magnitude, a mere 3% (approx.) of the South Korea’s GDP. (Cha & Kang (2003) p. 48). The cost of a reunification it is estimated between $250 billion and $3.5 trillion (Jeffries (2010) p. 545)

Also, the outcome of a North Korea without nuclear weapons could have meant an inside rebellion that could have destabilized the balance of powers in the region. Involving Russia, China, the US and Korea in a conflict that could be so expensive in terms of money and causalities.

To avoid the sudden collapse threat, South Korea started the sunshine policy, which is focused in promote good relations with North Korea, based in aid, economic deals, and a gradual approximation; always avoiding any confrontation or provocation. In addition, South Korea wants a further engagement with North Korea, through having closer economic ties. With this economic dependence, this country will not be willing to continue with the military actions against the South, and, with this links and their effects, it is hoped that will help to change the economy and the society of this country. (Bluth (2008) p. 190)

In general, all the main players in East Asia, want a denuclearised North Korea, due to the fears of an arms race in the region (financial times 11^th October 2006 p. 15) (Jeffries (2010) p. 5). But not all the countries share the same opinion. China would like to see a North Korea free of arms, and a more open regime, but, as it wants to keep the current status quo, is providing oil and an important quantity of food to help maintain the regime. This is because China do not want to have a collapsed North Korea, as this would represent a security and refugees problem, and also it would mean US troops in the border with China, as South Korea (an important ally of the US) would take the control of the country.

Japan tried to have friendly relations with North Korea and supported the engagement economic policy towards this state, in fact, it participated with the supply of resources. But its posture has become harder because several threats to the Japanese security, like the ballistic tests and the nuclear weapons acquisition. The same position is shared by the US, which sees the nuclear programme and ballistic projects as a threat to its troops deployed in South Korea and Japan, a to the West Coast.

Russia was an important ally for North Korea in the past. But now it shifted to South Korea due to economic reasons (a bigger economy were to export its natural resources). Otherwise it wants to keep the status quo because it does not want a pro-US unified Korea. And Russia does not want severe sanctions, because they could destabilize the regime and provoke security problems in the region (this is why, along with China, is voting for softer sanctions in the Security Council)

All are worried about the possibility of a conflict as it is thought that, if the North Korean regime sees itself too weak and nearly the collapse, it would try to take any advantage by a military action, as they would not have anything to loose. That is why they are trying a gradual transformation of the country, and continue giving resources to the country.

Summarizing, the nuclearisation of North Korea has positive aspects as, with this current situation, all the players would act with more responsibility. Also, the nuclear capabilities are not as large as it would have with only conventional arms, because the stockpile is not big, and the bombs not so powerful (Jeffries (2010) p. 5). It could be said that this is a more political than military advantage. In addition, the nuclear weapons can be considered the last attempt of the regime to survive; and it is thought that it would not try any irrational action, as the previous actions demonstrate that it wants to survive in its current political system and continue being an independent and sovereign state. That is why is trying to enter in the international community, like its attempts to enter in the IMF, Asian Development Bank and other international institutions.

Bibliography:

Bluth Christopher, Korea, 2008

Cha, Victor D. & Kang, David C., Nuclear North Korea, a debate on engagement strategies, 2003

Jeffries, Ian, Contemporary North Korea, a guide to economic and political developments, 2010

Q&A: “North Korea nuclear talks”. BBC. 20^th September 2011.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699

CNN World: “North Korea reportedly test-fire missiles”. Paula Hanckocks. 7^th January 2011.

http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-07/world/north.korea.missiles_1_test-fires-missiles-short-range-missile-north-korea?_s=PM:WORLD

Russia and the CIS countries. Hegemonism or neo-imperialism?

First of all, in order to understand of what terms are we going to talk about, it is necessary to define them.

Hegemony was defined by the theoretician Antonio Gramcsi at the beginning of the 20^th Century as the introduction on the society of values, ways of behaviour and other beliefs and attitudes that affect the daily life; by the ruling elite (Boggs (1976) p. 39) or by a country more powerful than the other. Therefore, the ruling elite position is seen as natural.

Neo-colonialism refers to the rule of foreign agents (countries or multinational corporations) on underdeveloped countries (usually former colonies). This rule typically takes form in an economic way. These foreign agents interfere in the government policies, and sometimes they act with military forces in order to change, or keep a favourable executive. The neo-imperialism nuance expose the fact that the rule is over cultures and ethnic groups different from the governing elites.

With these two terms defined, we are going to see if they are applicable to the Russian case and we will see afterwards if this country can be called neo-imperialist or hegemonist in its policies towards its neighbours.

The Soviet Union has been considered as an empires, as it has ruled multitude of different cultures and ethnic groups, and although there were not a ruling ethnic group, the Russians were the predominant one and hold most of the power (in example, in the Central Asian Soviet Republics, mostly all the skilled workers, in military factories and other technological complexes, and most of the enterprises were managed by Russians) (Webber (1997) p. 27-31; for Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan). It can be said that there were not a governing ethnic group as most of the General Secretaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were not Russians, but, regarding the previous mentioned fact, de facto a great part of the military establishment and economic power was controlled by Russians.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, multitude of Republics emerged as new countries, but most of them were weak in terms of economy and politic control of their own new territory; as they depended on the help of the extinct Soviet Union. This vacuum of power was rapidly filled by Russia by creating the Commonwealth of Independent States, a sort of union to integrate the new created republics into the Russia’s sphere, and in this way to secure precious resources and a “private market” for Russian goods, and a source of resources, like the raw minerals. Thus, the CIS was not created to fight against external threats like the NATO expansion; hence, to fulfil internal needs.

But, one of the main CIS goals for Russia is to protect the “near abroad” (that refers to the former Soviet Republics). The concept of “near abroad” states that Russia and the CIS countries need secure internal and external frontiers. Also for Russia this is a prerogative to protect the 25 million of Russians that live there (Munro and Rose (2006) p. 23), that need to be protected by Moscow, as, with the fall of the Soviet Union they have lost their status and can become a second class citizens. Linked to these reasons, in 1993 the New Russian Military Doctrine was issued, and it stated that Russia has a “special mission” protecting “the rights and interests of Russian citizens and persons abroad connected ethnically and culturally” with Russia. (Williams and Sfikas (1999) p. 220). Related with the Russian population living abroad, as it is said in the book “Do Russians see their future in Europe or in the CIS?”, “In the eleventh New Russia Barometer survey, 32 percent said that they had close relatives or friends living in the CIS countries”. This data demonstrates the close links these countries have, something important as it has consequences for a more closer union with Russia, as we will see forward.

The CIS international organization is the framework where the former Soviet republics have bilateral relations with Russia and also where they coordinate actions with other states (mainly economic and military actions). The interest that Russia has in this institution can be seen in the fact that 50% of the costs of the CIS are carried by Russia (Isakova (1998) p. 2).

The importance of the CIS for our essay is supported by the fact that is the framework where Russia tries to keep all the former Soviet states into its sphere of influence. Within the CIS, Russia effectuated “peacekeeping missions” in Tajikistan. This mission achieved the objective of backing the Tajikistan’s executive during the civil war that suffered, and is still suffering this country.

This military intervention shows the neo-imperialist policy of Russia, as maintained a pro-Russian government that is seeking to have closer ties with Moscow. The president of Tajikistan Emomali Rakhmonov even said that “without Russia, neither Tajikistan nor Tajik people would exist” (Webber (1997) p. 27). Also this intervention is connected with the “near abroad” doctrine, as Tajikistan had a Russian population of 560,000 (however with the civil war only remains 70-80,000 Russians) (Webber (1997) p. 27).

But, within the CIS, Russia does not held the same relation with its members (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, plus Turkmenistan and Ukraine that are not official members), it considers some more important than others, regarding it interests:

Belarus is a key country for Russian’s military, economic and political interests. Military because it represents the access to the Russian’s Kaliningrad exclave (a countermeasure to NATO’s expansion in the zone (Poland and Baltic States) and also because the value of the military installations placed there). On the economic side Belarus plays an important role in the transport of oil and gas to Europe (a sector where Russia gets important revenues). And political because in Belarus there are living 785,084 Russians (8.6% of the Belarusian population) (United Nations Demographic book 2009), Belarus also has the Russian as the official language and share with Russia close cultural ties; and what is more important for Russia, this country wants to keep its influence in this country, avoiding it to support the Baltic-Black Sea Confederation, because this could means the isolation for Russia from the West. (Isakova (1998) p. 14). Although in recent years the relations between this two countries have been deteriorating gradually.

Another core country for Russia is Ukraine, a not official member of the CIS, but with a large Russian population (8,334,100, the 17,3% of the Ukrainian population according with the States Statistic Committee of Ukraine 2001). This country has a similar culture and the Russian language is co-official with the Ukrainian. But, as this country has been enjoying an strong economic growth in the last decade is starting to look to the West the relations are becoming more problematic, however still being an important economic partner as through Ukraine pass 80% of the gas that Russia exports to Europe (The Guardian. “New Russia-Germany gas pipe avoid Ukraine”. November 7^th 2011). On the other side, in Sevastopol there is one of the most important Naval Bases of Russia, where the Black Sea fleet is placed; and Ukraine has tried to remove it from its territory; before the new president, with a pro-Russian inclination, took office.

Kazakhstan is also an important country as it has a large Russian population (23.7% of the population (2009) according with the Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan). Because of this large number of Russians living within the Kazakhstan’s borders, Moscow asked to the authorities to protect them and to establish a dual citizenship. This Russian minority controls, as in Tajikistan, important sectors of the economy, like the Military factories, and has an important participation in the energy field (as all the pipelines pass through Russia). These factors, linked with a shared border of 7,000 km with Russia, makes to the authorities want to have good relations with Russia and a major economic and political integration. (Webber (1997) p. 29)

For Russia is important to keep Kazakhstan into its sphere of influence because is fundamental in order to be influential in the Central Asia region.

To end the enumeration of the countries. Kyrgyzstan has a large Russian population (20%). It tried to gain economic independence from Russia, but with a severe bank crisis during the 1996-1997, it has to return to the sphere of influence and the protection of Russia’s economic subsidies and loans, loosing political independence. (Isakova (1998) p. 20).

Along with Kazakhstan, Belarus and Tajikistan; Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Eurasian Economic Community. This is an organization within the CIS that promotes a Common Economic Spaces among the members, with no customs and freedom of movement. It is a step forward in the attempt to restore the ancient single Soviet market.

Uzbekistan is rich in gold, oil, gas and uranium, and the first cotton producer among the former soviet states (having as consequence environmental problems like the Aral Sea), because of its economic successes, the country has tried to move forward to the Western countries, and gain economic independence from Russia, (Webber (1997) p. 30) for example, Uzbekistan bought two Spanish high-speed trains in 2009 (inaugurating the line in 2011) (The independent. “Uzbekistan shows off Central Asia’s high-speed train”. 31^st August 2011). Turkmenistan is a different country as it has close ties with Afghanistan and Iran; and as it does not want to depend on the Soviet pipelines controlled by Russia (Webber (1997) p. 33) it is projecting a pipeline to supply gas to India. This pipeline will pass through Afghanistan and Pakistan (called TAPI and backed by the USA), or Iran and Pakistan (called IPI). (The New York Times. “New backing for gas line through Asia”. 11^th December 2010). This country has the most homogeneous population in Central Asia. Armenia is a firmly supporter of the CIS institution, and as it had the support of Russia towards the Nagorno-Karabakh problem with Azerbaijan (supported by Turkey), is open to closer relations with Russia, with which shares mistrust with Turkey. A point that collaborates with the good relations with Russia is that Armenia does not have a sizeable Russian population, consequently there is no Russian interferences related this issue. Azerbaijan has an strong energetic sector and good relations with Turkey, therefore it sees the Commonwealth of Independent States as a continuation of the Soviet imperialism, and against its independence. (Webber (1997) p. 23)

Finishing the Caucasian countries we found a complex case that deserves, and one where we can see the current Russian policy. Georgia. This country was not a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States when the set-up of this organization was made, as a result of the nationalistic feeling of the Georgian president. But, because of the internal tensions with the secessionist movements of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that were bucked by Russian soldiers (but it is not totally clear), and the formal pressures sent from Moscow to join the organization, the 3^rd of December of 1993 Georgia joined to the CIS in an attempt to save the disintegration of the country as the result of the independent movements. A CIS peacekeeping force was sent to the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and this conflicts became “frozen conflicts” for some years. Meanwhile the Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze made a foreign policy of two sides, working with the CIS countries for a deep integration, and on the other side looking for close ties with the West. The interest of Russia in the CIS peacekeeping forces lays in the Russian population living in both Georgian separatist territories. But as the years passed, more and more inhabitants of these territories were holding Russian passport, reaching the estimated actual level of 83%. And, in addition, in 2006, two thirds of the total budget came from Russia ($35 millions). With this situation of proved support from Russia to these separatist quasi-countries, in 2003 took office in Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, who promised to introduce the country to the NATO and to regain the control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. With deteriorated relations with the Western countries because the acceptation by them of the application to join NATO by Ukraine and Georgia in 2006 and the Kosovo independence recognition by almost all the international community, the hostilities between Georgia and Russia started. The 2008 war did not change the status quo situation, because at the end the boundaries remained like before, except for the important detail of the independence recognition by Russia of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (and Venezuela, Nauru and Nicaragua also did so). After this recognition Russia has started projects in these two republics to build military bases. Also Russia is the main guarantor of their de facto independence by investing a lot of money to repair the war loses and paying the pensions of their inhabitants. An interesting point is the investment of the Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom to build a pipeline from Russia to both republics for $640 million. (Reuters FactBox South Ossetia, Abkhazia and the 2008 War).

After this war, some allies in the NATO started to think about the enlargement to the East, and if it would be worthy for the organization, if with this, what they provoke is the anger of Russia.

The common denominator of all these relations (except for Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Poland, Hungary, Romania, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and the Baltic Republics that are out of the Russia’s sphere ) are the attempt of Russia to keep under its control all these countries by using its economic power, and in some cases its military strength. Almost all these countries have in common a weak economy and a high skilled Russian minority. In the case of Tajikistan, this minority has demonstrated to be worthy, as with the start of the instabilities due to the war, a great number of them migrated from the country leaving the economic sector in a weak situation.

An explanation for the Russian commitment to the former Soviet republics is the Russian worries about the stability of these countries, as they hold a big Russian population. And if this population decide to emigrate to Russia, this country it is thought that would not be able to absorb all of them, originating a saturation of public services like schools, hospitals or even the housing sector. Therefore Russia is trying to defend them abroad because it thinks that by this way it would be less expensive for the country. Another explanation is that the military interventions and peacekeeping forces are deployed abroad trying to solve the problems there and avoiding to have a bigger problem that could be extended into the Russian borders, like the Georgian problem of South Ossetia that could extend the conflict into North Ossetia and the conflictive region of Chechnya.

Analysing all the relations with the mentioned post-soviet countries, that belong to the Eurasian region, we can see that these relations can be classified within the hegemonism label. But, it is true that some of them shows also neo-imperialism characteristics. A neo-imperialist action was the war of Georgia of 2008, where Russia stated itself as protector of two countries that are clearly pro-Russian (as this country is the main ally they have and it makes possible their survival). Russia is building several military bases and, among other reasons, Russia maybe wanted a successful independence of these two countries in order to have two gap countries between Russia and the possible new Georgia NATO member.

Also, Russia is maintaining in power pro-Russian governments, even if they are not democratic, by military ways, or by interfering in the elections. Maintaining governments by the use of the force is a recognized neo-imperialist behaviour that is used by other former empires, like France in the Sub-Saharan countries, in order to keep its influence there, and to “help” its national companies to obtain profitable deals.

Applying the definition stated at the beginning of this text, the neo-imperialism is the domination (politic and economic) over a country or region that has different ethnic groups and cultures. Like the Central Asian republics that have different religion and ethnic groups from Russia.

The relation of Russia among the post-Soviet countries is hegemonic as it is seeking to use them as a private market free of “foreign” influences. Another point that supports this idea is that Russia is not looking to develop the CIS countries (unlike the European Union that provides funds to develop all kind of structures and boost the economy of the members), in this case is looking to use the resources and to regain the lost economic level in order to return to the international forums as a global power that it used to be. There are hegemonism characteristics in the fact that Russia wanted the CIS countries to have a single position in the international summits like the United Nations, and that position would have been the Russian one, as it is, with difference, the most important country in this international organization. In addition, Russia urged all its CIS allies to make the Russian an official language in all the CIS territories, something that, except for the countries where it is the official language, they refused to do so. In all these situation Russia enforce profitable treaties and its particular view of the international and national affairs by applying its economic (soft power) and military strength (hard power). Another hegemonic aspect of this relations is the “near abroad” doctrine, which establish the protection of Russian citizens goal over the respect of the sovereign integrity of the countries.

But this foreign policy cannot be fully named as neo-imperialism as it does not have the strength to deploy all its capabilities to gain a full control over the countries. It is, somehow, willing to has an neo-imperial relation, but its own limitations let it only to impose its economic and political views without having a total control.

Summarizing, the foreign Russian policy towards its neighbours has hegemonism characteristics, and some neo-imperialism ones. To finish, it would be illustrative to say, that, according with the book “Ethnicity and nationalism in Russia, the CIS countries and the Baltic states” that the restoration of the Russian empire would be seen as a symptom of recovery of the greatness of the country, and that much of the parties policy speeches have imperialist features (as the imperialistic idea is linked with the nationalistic feeling, that it is present in almost all the parties).

Bibliography:

1- Boggs, C., Gramsci’s Marxism. 1976

2-.State Statistics Committee of Ukraine .” All Ukrainian population census 2001”

http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/

3-Reuters. “New Russia-Germany gas pipe avoid Ukraine”. The Guardian. November 7^th 2011

4-AFP. “Uzbekistan shows off Central Asia’s high-speed train”. The independent. 31^st August 2011

5-Andrew E. Kramer. “New backing for gas line through Asia”. The New York Times. 11^th December 2010

6- Williams, Christopher & D. Sfikas, Thanasis. Ethnicity and Nationalism in Russia, the CIS and the Baltic States. 1999.

7- Lynch, Dov, Russian peacekeeping strategies in the CIS. 2000.

8- Isakova, Irina, The CIS and Europe: Evolving Security Relationships. 1998.

9- Webber, Mark, CIS Integration Trends. Russia and the Former Soviet South. 1997.

10- Rose, Professor Richard & Munro, Dr. Neil, Do Russians see their future in Europe or the CIS?. 2006

11- The Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan .”The Results of the National Population Census in 2009”. 11/12/2010,

http://www.eng.stat.kz/news/Pages/n1_12_11_10.aspx

12-FACTBOX. “What is Georgia’s rebel’s South Ossetia region?”. Reuters. 8^th August 2008.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/08/08/idUSL8557850

13-Factbox. “Key facts on Georgian rebel region Abkhazia”. Reuters. 17^th February 2010

http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/17/us-russia-georgia-abkhazia-factbox-idUSTRE61G2FP20100217

14-FACTBOX. “Facts about the 2008 war in Georgia. Reuters”. 4^th August 2009.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/04/us-georgia-war-conflict-sb-idUSTRE5732TH20090804