First of all, in order to understand of what terms are we going to talk about, it is necessary to define them.
Hegemony was defined by the theoretician Antonio Gramcsi at the beginning of the 20th Century as the introduction on the society of values, ways of behaviour and other beliefs and attitudes that affect the daily life; by the ruling elite (Boggs (1976) p. 39) or by a country more powerful than the other. Therefore, the ruling elite position is seen as natural.
Neo-colonialism refers to the rule of foreign agents (countries or multinational corporations) on underdeveloped countries (usually former colonies). This rule typically takes form in an economic way. These foreign agents interfere in the government policies, and sometimes they act with military forces in order to change, or keep a favourable executive. The neo-imperialism nuance expose the fact that the rule is over cultures and ethnic groups different from the governing elites.
With these two terms defined, we are going to see if they are applicable to the Russian case and we will see afterwards if this country can be called neo-imperialist or hegemonist in its policies towards its neighbours.
The Soviet Union has been considered as an empires, as it has ruled multitude of different cultures and ethnic groups, and although there were not a ruling ethnic group, the Russians were the predominant one and hold most of the power (in example, in the Central Asian Soviet Republics, mostly all the skilled workers, in military factories and other technological complexes, and most of the enterprises were managed by Russians) (Webber (1997) p. 27-31; for Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan). It can be said that there were not a governing ethnic group as most of the General Secretaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were not Russians, but, regarding the previous mentioned fact, de facto a great part of the military establishment and economic power was controlled by Russians.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, multitude of Republics emerged as new countries, but most of them were weak in terms of economy and politic control of their own new territory; as they depended on the help of the extinct Soviet Union. This vacuum of power was rapidly filled by Russia by creating the Commonwealth of Independent States, a sort of union to integrate the new created republics into the Russia’s sphere, and in this way to secure precious resources and a “private market” for Russian goods, and a source of resources, like the raw minerals. Thus, the CIS was not created to fight against external threats like the NATO expansion; hence, to fulfil internal needs.
But, one of the main CIS goals for Russia is to protect the “near abroad” (that refers to the former Soviet Republics). The concept of “near abroad” states that Russia and the CIS countries need secure internal and external frontiers. Also for Russia this is a prerogative to protect the 25 million of Russians that live there (Munro and Rose (2006) p. 23), that need to be protected by Moscow, as, with the fall of the Soviet Union they have lost their status and can become a second class citizens. Linked to these reasons, in 1993 the New Russian Military Doctrine was issued, and it stated that Russia has a “special mission” protecting “the rights and interests of Russian citizens and persons abroad connected ethnically and culturally” with Russia. (Williams and Sfikas (1999) p. 220). Related with the Russian population living abroad, as it is said in the book “Do Russians see their future in Europe or in the CIS?”, “In the eleventh New Russia Barometer survey, 32 percent said that they had close relatives or friends living in the CIS countries”. This data demonstrates the close links these countries have, something important as it has consequences for a more closer union with Russia, as we will see forward.
The CIS international organization is the framework where the former Soviet republics have bilateral relations with Russia and also where they coordinate actions with other states (mainly economic and military actions). The interest that Russia has in this institution can be seen in the fact that 50% of the costs of the CIS are carried by Russia (Isakova (1998) p. 2).
The importance of the CIS for our essay is supported by the fact that is the framework where Russia tries to keep all the former Soviet states into its sphere of influence. Within the CIS, Russia effectuated “peacekeeping missions” in Tajikistan. This mission achieved the objective of backing the Tajikistan’s executive during the civil war that suffered, and is still suffering this country.
This military intervention shows the neo-imperialist policy of Russia, as maintained a pro-Russian government that is seeking to have closer ties with Moscow. The president of Tajikistan Emomali Rakhmonov even said that “without Russia, neither Tajikistan nor Tajik people would exist” (Webber (1997) p. 27). Also this intervention is connected with the “near abroad” doctrine, as Tajikistan had a Russian population of 560,000 (however with the civil war only remains 70-80,000 Russians) (Webber (1997) p. 27).
But, within the CIS, Russia does not held the same relation with its members (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, plus Turkmenistan and Ukraine that are not official members), it considers some more important than others, regarding it interests:
Belarus is a key country for Russian’s military, economic and political interests. Military because it represents the access to the Russian’s Kaliningrad exclave (a countermeasure to NATO’s expansion in the zone (Poland and Baltic States) and also because the value of the military installations placed there). On the economic side Belarus plays an important role in the transport of oil and gas to Europe (a sector where Russia gets important revenues). And political because in Belarus there are living 785,084 Russians (8.6% of the Belarusian population) (United Nations Demographic book 2009), Belarus also has the Russian as the official language and share with Russia close cultural ties; and what is more important for Russia, this country wants to keep its influence in this country, avoiding it to support the Baltic-Black Sea Confederation, because this could means the isolation for Russia from the West. (Isakova (1998) p. 14). Although in recent years the relations between this two countries have been deteriorating gradually.
Another core country for Russia is Ukraine, a not official member of the CIS, but with a large Russian population (8,334,100, the 17,3% of the Ukrainian population according with the States Statistic Committee of Ukraine 2001). This country has a similar culture and the Russian language is co-official with the Ukrainian. But, as this country has been enjoying an strong economic growth in the last decade is starting to look to the West the relations are becoming more problematic, however still being an important economic partner as through Ukraine pass 80% of the gas that Russia exports to Europe (The Guardian. “New Russia-Germany gas pipe avoid Ukraine”. November 7th 2011). On the other side, in Sevastopol there is one of the most important Naval Bases of Russia, where the Black Sea fleet is placed; and Ukraine has tried to remove it from its territory; before the new president, with a pro-Russian inclination, took office.
Kazakhstan is also an important country as it has a large Russian population (23.7% of the population (2009) according with the Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan). Because of this large number of Russians living within the Kazakhstan’s borders, Moscow asked to the authorities to protect them and to establish a dual citizenship. This Russian minority controls, as in Tajikistan, important sectors of the economy, like the Military factories, and has an important participation in the energy field (as all the pipelines pass through Russia). These factors, linked with a shared border of 7,000 km with Russia, makes to the authorities want to have good relations with Russia and a major economic and political integration. (Webber (1997) p. 29)
For Russia is important to keep Kazakhstan into its sphere of influence because is fundamental in order to be influential in the Central Asia region.
To end the enumeration of the countries. Kyrgyzstan has a large Russian population (20%). It tried to gain economic independence from Russia, but with a severe bank crisis during the 1996-1997, it has to return to the sphere of influence and the protection of Russia’s economic subsidies and loans, loosing political independence. (Isakova (1998) p. 20).
Along with Kazakhstan, Belarus and Tajikistan; Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Eurasian Economic Community. This is an organization within the CIS that promotes a Common Economic Spaces among the members, with no customs and freedom of movement. It is a step forward in the attempt to restore the ancient single Soviet market.
Uzbekistan is rich in gold, oil, gas and uranium, and the first cotton producer among the former soviet states (having as consequence environmental problems like the Aral Sea), because of its economic successes, the country has tried to move forward to the Western countries, and gain economic independence from Russia, (Webber (1997) p. 30) for example, Uzbekistan bought two Spanish high-speed trains in 2009 (inaugurating the line in 2011) (The independent. “Uzbekistan shows off Central Asia’s high-speed train”. 31st August 2011). Turkmenistan is a different country as it has close ties with Afghanistan and Iran; and as it does not want to depend on the Soviet pipelines controlled by Russia (Webber (1997) p. 33) it is projecting a pipeline to supply gas to India. This pipeline will pass through Afghanistan and Pakistan (called TAPI and backed by the USA), or Iran and Pakistan (called IPI). (The New York Times. “New backing for gas line through Asia”. 11th December 2010). This country has the most homogeneous population in Central Asia. Armenia is a firmly supporter of the CIS institution, and as it had the support of Russia towards the Nagorno-Karabakh problem with Azerbaijan (supported by Turkey), is open to closer relations with Russia, with which shares mistrust with Turkey. A point that collaborates with the good relations with Russia is that Armenia does not have a sizeable Russian population, consequently there is no Russian interferences related this issue. Azerbaijan has an strong energetic sector and good relations with Turkey, therefore it sees the Commonwealth of Independent States as a continuation of the Soviet imperialism, and against its independence. (Webber (1997) p. 23)
Finishing the Caucasian countries we found a complex case that deserves, and one where we can see the current Russian policy. Georgia. This country was not a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States when the set-up of this organization was made, as a result of the nationalistic feeling of the Georgian president. But, because of the internal tensions with the secessionist movements of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that were bucked by Russian soldiers (but it is not totally clear), and the formal pressures sent from Moscow to join the organization, the 3rd of December of 1993 Georgia joined to the CIS in an attempt to save the disintegration of the country as the result of the independent movements. A CIS peacekeeping force was sent to the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and this conflicts became “frozen conflicts” for some years. Meanwhile the Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze made a foreign policy of two sides, working with the CIS countries for a deep integration, and on the other side looking for close ties with the West. The interest of Russia in the CIS peacekeeping forces lays in the Russian population living in both Georgian separatist territories. But as the years passed, more and more inhabitants of these territories were holding Russian passport, reaching the estimated actual level of 83%. And, in addition, in 2006, two thirds of the total budget came from Russia ($35 millions). With this situation of proved support from Russia to these separatist quasi-countries, in 2003 took office in Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, who promised to introduce the country to the NATO and to regain the control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. With deteriorated relations with the Western countries because the acceptation by them of the application to join NATO by Ukraine and Georgia in 2006 and the Kosovo independence recognition by almost all the international community, the hostilities between Georgia and Russia started. The 2008 war did not change the status quo situation, because at the end the boundaries remained like before, except for the important detail of the independence recognition by Russia of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (and Venezuela, Nauru and Nicaragua also did so). After this recognition Russia has started projects in these two republics to build military bases. Also Russia is the main guarantor of their de facto independence by investing a lot of money to repair the war loses and paying the pensions of their inhabitants. An interesting point is the investment of the Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom to build a pipeline from Russia to both republics for $640 million. (Reuters FactBox South Ossetia, Abkhazia and the 2008 War).
After this war, some allies in the NATO started to think about the enlargement to the East, and if it would be worthy for the organization, if with this, what they provoke is the anger of Russia.
The common denominator of all these relations (except for Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Poland, Hungary, Romania, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and the Baltic Republics that are out of the Russia’s sphere ) are the attempt of Russia to keep under its control all these countries by using its economic power, and in some cases its military strength. Almost all these countries have in common a weak economy and a high skilled Russian minority. In the case of Tajikistan, this minority has demonstrated to be worthy, as with the start of the instabilities due to the war, a great number of them migrated from the country leaving the economic sector in a weak situation.
An explanation for the Russian commitment to the former Soviet republics is the Russian worries about the stability of these countries, as they hold a big Russian population. And if this population decide to emigrate to Russia, this country it is thought that would not be able to absorb all of them, originating a saturation of public services like schools, hospitals or even the housing sector. Therefore Russia is trying to defend them abroad because it thinks that by this way it would be less expensive for the country. Another explanation is that the military interventions and peacekeeping forces are deployed abroad trying to solve the problems there and avoiding to have a bigger problem that could be extended into the Russian borders, like the Georgian problem of South Ossetia that could extend the conflict into North Ossetia and the conflictive region of Chechnya.
Analysing all the relations with the mentioned post-soviet countries, that belong to the Eurasian region, we can see that these relations can be classified within the hegemonism label. But, it is true that some of them shows also neo-imperialism characteristics. A neo-imperialist action was the war of Georgia of 2008, where Russia stated itself as protector of two countries that are clearly pro-Russian (as this country is the main ally they have and it makes possible their survival). Russia is building several military bases and, among other reasons, Russia maybe wanted a successful independence of these two countries in order to have two gap countries between Russia and the possible new Georgia NATO member.
Also, Russia is maintaining in power pro-Russian governments, even if they are not democratic, by military ways, or by interfering in the elections. Maintaining governments by the use of the force is a recognized neo-imperialist behaviour that is used by other former empires, like France in the Sub-Saharan countries, in order to keep its influence there, and to “help” its national companies to obtain profitable deals.
Applying the definition stated at the beginning of this text, the neo-imperialism is the domination (politic and economic) over a country or region that has different ethnic groups and cultures. Like the Central Asian republics that have different religion and ethnic groups from Russia.
The relation of Russia among the post-Soviet countries is hegemonic as it is seeking to use them as a private market free of “foreign” influences. Another point that supports this idea is that Russia is not looking to develop the CIS countries (unlike the European Union that provides funds to develop all kind of structures and boost the economy of the members), in this case is looking to use the resources and to regain the lost economic level in order to return to the international forums as a global power that it used to be. There are hegemonism characteristics in the fact that Russia wanted the CIS countries to have a single position in the international summits like the United Nations, and that position would have been the Russian one, as it is, with difference, the most important country in this international organization. In addition, Russia urged all its CIS allies to make the Russian an official language in all the CIS territories, something that, except for the countries where it is the official language, they refused to do so. In all these situation Russia enforce profitable treaties and its particular view of the international and national affairs by applying its economic (soft power) and military strength (hard power). Another hegemonic aspect of this relations is the “near abroad” doctrine, which establish the protection of Russian citizens goal over the respect of the sovereign integrity of the countries.
But this foreign policy cannot be fully named as neo-imperialism as it does not have the strength to deploy all its capabilities to gain a full control over the countries. It is, somehow, willing to has an neo-imperial relation, but its own limitations let it only to impose its economic and political views without having a total control.
Summarizing, the foreign Russian policy towards its neighbours has hegemonism characteristics, and some neo-imperialism ones. To finish, it would be illustrative to say, that, according with the book “Ethnicity and nationalism in Russia, the CIS countries and the Baltic states” that the restoration of the Russian empire would be seen as a symptom of recovery of the greatness of the country, and that much of the parties policy speeches have imperialist features (as the imperialistic idea is linked with the nationalistic feeling, that it is present in almost all the parties).
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