When North Korea confirmed the 21st of March, 2006, that was in possession of nuclear weapons, the international community answered with concern; as it meant the increase in the threat that North Korea represents for South Korea, Japan; and the stability of East Asia. But, there is another view of this issue that points in the direction that, with this new North Korean’s nuclear capabilities, the Peninsula of Korea is now more stable than decades ago.
Along this essay we are going to discuss these two points of view, and try to conclude which of these is the most correct one.
The first, and most rational, reaction, is of disquiet, as North Korea has threatened several times to start a war against South Korea; and has endangered the status quo with several military actions along the DMZ border (with attacks to US and ROK troops at Panmunjom in 1976, or the incursion of North Korean commandos in the Blue House, in 1968, in an attempt to assassinate the South Korea’s president, and several more) (Bruce & Hayes (2011) p. 71). In addition, North Korea has one of the largest number of soldiers and conventional forces in the world, with an estimated 1,400,000 million of personnel (mainly concentrated in the border with South Korea). (www.bbc.co.uk 20th September 2011)
With the previous mentioned figures, and the latest missiles tests carried on (the last one that has been reported was the 7th of January, 2011 (according with CNN 7th January 2011)), there is a fear that North Korea is trying to develop Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) capable to carry nuclear heads. Also, there are some pieces of information that point to the fact that North Korea is transferring its nuclear and ballistic knowledge to potential destabilizing countries like Syria or Iran, with close ties with North Korea. Even, one jet from Israel attacked one facility in Syria that was thought to be a nuclear reactor under construction with help from North Korea (Jeffries (2010) p. 15-16).
With the previously mentioned facts, North Korea could be considered as a major threat for East Asia, and even the Western world. But the truth is that, it is a threat, but not of “big concern” as it would be thought. This can be affirmed because almost all its military equipment is Soviet technology of the 1970s, or earlier (Cha & Kang (2003) p. 53), the country suffers serious energy restrictions as its major supplier of oil and gas was the former Soviet Union, which supplied the country at subsidised prices, but now Russia is willing to do so with the condition that this service would be provided at market prices. This, linked with the fact that 60% of the pit coal mines are flooded, leaves the country in a difficult situation; and, although with the songun doctrine (all the country’s resources are destined to the army), its capability is not bigger, as it suffers petrol restrictions, and, for example, the engine vehicles cannot be used as much as it would be necessary for a proper training of the soldiers (the pilots take one training flight per month, rather than the US ones that takes 10 (Cha & Kang (2003) p. 52)). During the 1960s and beginning of 70s North Korea was in advantage in economic and military terms, but with the collapse of its heavy industrialized economic model, South Korea overtook it. And, as an illustrative example, in 1997 South Korea spent $14billion in the military budget, when North Korea spent only $5billion. (Kang & Cha (2003) p. 50).
After the Korean War North Korea recovered faster than its neighbour in the South because of the communist policies that boosted a fast industrialisation. And also because the help of the Soviet Union and China (North Korea tried to be neutral in this aspect and do not support one side against the other)
Without its ancient allies (Russia and China, that is starting to be a global actor, refusing to be involved in regional problems), North Korea is an anachronic an authoritarian dictatorship with a communist economic that is proved to have failed (and led to famines and economic recession during the 90s). In the international sphere its situation was not much better, as it only held relations with pariah states, and the United States considered this country as a real threat (in fact they still in war, because no peace treaty was signed between them at the end of the Korean War), and wanted to isolate it in order to provoke the fall of the government.
Surpassed by South Korea in economy, military (in quality terms, and backed by the US troops deployed there) North Korea was not in position to lead and impose its views in a possible unification of the peninsula, and what is more, in this conditions, its survival as a country was threatened, as it was more vulnerable to an attack.
To reach some parity in the military magnitude North Korea started to develop a nuclear weapons programme as earlier as in 1966/1967 (parity, because the US deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea after the war) (Bluth (2008) p. 148). Also, this type of arm would give North Korea the needed strength in the international meetings to ask for demands during the negotiations. In addition, it would give a higher status towards the US and South Korea. (Bluth (2008) p. 63)
The acquisition of nuclear weapons also was important for the regime in terms of reaffirmation of the authority inside its country and improving the relation with the military establishment. And avoiding with this action a possible coup d’état.
Towards other countries, it was also positive, as helped to elude a potential military joint action against the country, due the nuclear weapons act as an effective deterrent effect (Cha & Kang (2003) p. 54). This idea that the leaders of the regime had about the nuclear weapons was boosted by the Iraq war (Bluth (2008) p. 116) and later by the Libyan civil war, where Gadhafi gave up with his nuclear programme, and at the first opportunity was removed of his charge with the support of the Allies.
What is true is that the nuclear weapons gave stability to the North Korean regime. With North Korea in possession of them, South Korea and the US would not try to start a risky adventure to change the regime.
These, among other reasons, are why North Korea did not cooperated in the progress of the Six-Party Talks meetings about the denuclearisation of the country. It did not want to give up with one of the last resources it has left for a negotiation, and for asking for aid, while keeping the deterrent force.
Also, somehow, this nuclear programme was profitable for South Korea, and even China and Russia. Since North Korea was closer to collapse (because of the economic problems, the deteriorating situation of the army, and social problems like the famines that suffered the population), this collapse could have had a devastating effect. This could have produced a massive migration to South Korea that could not have been absorbed (China, since the 1950s, has received an approximated number of 500,000 North Koreans (Jeffries (2010) p. 71), provoking an economic and social crisis. And if South Korea would have had to annex North Korea it would have needed a large amount of money to do so, as this economy only represents, in economic magnitude, a mere 3% (approx.) of the South Korea’s GDP. (Cha & Kang (2003) p. 48). The cost of a reunification it is estimated between $250 billion and $3.5 trillion (Jeffries (2010) p. 545)
Also, the outcome of a North Korea without nuclear weapons could have meant an inside rebellion that could have destabilized the balance of powers in the region. Involving Russia, China, the US and Korea in a conflict that could be so expensive in terms of money and causalities.
To avoid the sudden collapse threat, South Korea started the sunshine policy, which is focused in promote good relations with North Korea, based in aid, economic deals, and a gradual approximation; always avoiding any confrontation or provocation. In addition, South Korea wants a further engagement with North Korea, through having closer economic ties. With this economic dependence, this country will not be willing to continue with the military actions against the South, and, with this links and their effects, it is hoped that will help to change the economy and the society of this country. (Bluth (2008) p. 190)
In general, all the main players in East Asia, want a denuclearised North Korea, due to the fears of an arms race in the region (financial times 11th October 2006 p. 15) (Jeffries (2010) p. 5). But not all the countries share the same opinion. China would like to see a North Korea free of arms, and a more open regime, but, as it wants to keep the current status quo, is providing oil and an important quantity of food to help maintain the regime. This is because China do not want to have a collapsed North Korea, as this would represent a security and refugees problem, and also it would mean US troops in the border with China, as South Korea (an important ally of the US) would take the control of the country.
Japan tried to have friendly relations with North Korea and supported the engagement economic policy towards this state, in fact, it participated with the supply of resources. But its posture has become harder because several threats to the Japanese security, like the ballistic tests and the nuclear weapons acquisition. The same position is shared by the US, which sees the nuclear programme and ballistic projects as a threat to its troops deployed in South Korea and Japan, a to the West Coast.
Russia was an important ally for North Korea in the past. But now it shifted to South Korea due to economic reasons (a bigger economy were to export its natural resources). Otherwise it wants to keep the status quo because it does not want a pro-US unified Korea. And Russia does not want severe sanctions, because they could destabilize the regime and provoke security problems in the region (this is why, along with China, is voting for softer sanctions in the Security Council)
All are worried about the possibility of a conflict as it is thought that, if the North Korean regime sees itself too weak and nearly the collapse, it would try to take any advantage by a military action, as they would not have anything to loose. That is why they are trying a gradual transformation of the country, and continue giving resources to the country.
Summarizing, the nuclearisation of North Korea has positive aspects as, with this current situation, all the players would act with more responsibility. Also, the nuclear capabilities are not as large as it would have with only conventional arms, because the stockpile is not big, and the bombs not so powerful (Jeffries (2010) p. 5). It could be said that this is a more political than military advantage. In addition, the nuclear weapons can be considered the last attempt of the regime to survive; and it is thought that it would not try any irrational action, as the previous actions demonstrate that it wants to survive in its current political system and continue being an independent and sovereign state. That is why is trying to enter in the international community, like its attempts to enter in the IMF, Asian Development Bank and other international institutions.
Bibliography:
Bluth Christopher, Korea, 2008
Cha, Victor D. & Kang, David C., Nuclear North Korea, a debate on engagement strategies, 2003
Jeffries, Ian, Contemporary North Korea, a guide to economic and political developments, 2010
Q&A: “North Korea nuclear talks”. BBC. 20th September 2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699
CNN World: “North Korea reportedly test-fire missiles”. Paula Hanckocks. 7th January 2011.
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